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Executive Summary 
For Resource-Producing countries, defined as countries that rely heavily on production and revenues 
from non-renewable or exhaustible natural resources such as oil and gas, there are two main 
challenges for economic management: 
• How should economic- and fiscal policies be designed and executed efficiently to sustain 
growth and development in the face of exhaustability? 
• How should Ministries of Planning – and Finance in these countries measure economic 
performance? 
These two challenges are discussed in this Policy Paper, and it is argued that resource -producing 
countries – RPCs - should as far as possible: 
• Establish a solid national tax regime to extract the natural resource rent for the domestic 
population. This requires building up national institutions and technical expertise, notably in 
Ministries of Planning – Economy and Finance, to match foreign companies; 
• Establish a Fiscal Guideline (Rule) for the domestic use of the revenues from non-renewable 
resources which are exhaustible, so that the resource revenues are largely used to enhance 
real- and human capital, and thus the capital base to build the country. In other words, transfer 
the non-renewable natural wealth into other types of income generating wealth for growth and 
future development. In this connection, a number of experiences in RPCs have been that the 
capacity to invest in infrastructure etc. is often significantly overestimated so that a number of 
projects with good intentions are not realized or even wasted; 
• Establish a Savings Instrument for this wealth transfer. In Norway this saving mechanism is a 
permanent Fund, a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) The Governments Pension Fund – Global, a 
wholly owned government buffer and savings fund which is the political responsibility of The 
Ministry of Finance. A number of various types of Natural Resource Funds exist, and a 
«Norwegian» type Fund was established in 2005 in a Low Income Resource Producing 
Country (LIRPC) - Timor-Leste. The experiences of Norway and Timor-Leste are discussed 
in sections V and VI of this paper; 
• Use as far as possible wealth accounting in developed RPCs, and in developing RPCs simple 
sustainability indicators such as Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) recommended by The World 
Bank to assess economic performance ,correcting for the fact that GDP measures according to 
present national accounting conventions (SNA 93) does not deduct the depletion of natural 
resources. A RPC could thus draw down its non-renewable natural resources, boosting GDP in 
the short run, and depending on how the revenues are spent end up as poorer with a lower 
national wealth per capita – an example of the so called «resource curse» or «Dutch disease» 
referring to the policy failures of The Netherlands in the 1970s.  
It is concluded that establishing clear guidelines for sustainable fiscal policies and transparent saving 
instruments, adjusted to the level of development and national circumstances in the resource-
producing country in case, is i sine qua non for longer term growth and sustainable development in all 
RPCs – whether developed or LIRPCs. There are many historical and present examples in developed 
and developing countries of policy failures where simple rules for sustainable economic- and fiscal 
policies did not exist or were not followed, leading to lack of transfer of natural wealth into other types 
of wealth – and thus bursts of growth of GDP which was not sustained. However, there are also 
examples of how the opportunities presented by an ample endowment of non-renewable natural 
resources may be exploited to build countries gradually and sustainably.   
Some basic rules for sustainable economic- and fiscal policies in RPCs are summed up in section 7.  
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1 Introduction  
The purpose of this policy paper is two fold: 
• Ask what resource producing developing countries, notably Low Income Resource 
Producing Countries – the LIRPCs – may learn from 40 years of experience of 
economic- and fiscal policies in a developed resource producing country – Norway; 
• Review simple and basic rules for economic- and fiscal policies relevant for all 
resource producing countries, RPCs, – that is countries rich on non-renewable natural 
capital like oil and gas – in order for such countries to transform such exhaustible 
resources into other types of income generating wealth for growth and sustainable 
development. 
In section 2 basic modern development theory is briefly set forth in non-technical terms as a 
background for the rest of the paper. Section 3 goes into the challenges for policies of the so 
called resource curse which potentially face all countries with large stocks of non-renewable 
resources. Section 6 reviews briefly necessary conditions for sustainable fiscal policies in 
RPCs, and sections 5 and 6 analyze how a developed RPC – Norway – and a LIPRPC – 
Timor leste – have applied these policy principles in actual practice, including establishing 
permanent Natural Resource Funds. 
Section 7 concludes on principles for sustainable economic- and fiscal policies in RPCs, and 
Annex 1 discusses indicators for assessing the sustainability of economic progress in such 
countries. Annex 2 elaborates on what developing RPCs may learn from 40 years of 
Norwegian experiences. 
2  Wealth, Social Welfare and Development 
Development is, at heart, a process of building wealth – the produced, natural, human and 
institutional capital which is the source of income and well-being. 
I start with the assumption that total wealth equals a measure of intertemporal wellbeing or 
social welfare W, the present value of future consumption. For an elaboration of why this may 
be so, see Hamilton and Hartwick: »Investing Exhaustible Resource Rents and the Path of 
Consumption», Canadian Journal of Economics, May 2005. 
More than 50 years have passed since Robert Solow wrote his seminal article. «A 
Contribution to the Theory of Growth» (1956) Quarterly Journal of Economics 70:65-94. 
Since then four major development or growth paradigms have emerged in the economic 
literature: 
• Neoclassical; 
• AK; 
• Product-Variety; and 
• Schumpeterian. 
See Aghion and Howitt: «The Economics of Growth» (2009), and Jones: »Introduction to 
Economic Growth» (1998). 
As documented in these books, a large economic literature has evovlved since Solow 
presented his neoclassical growth equation in which development depended on 
(homogeneous) labour, traditional real or produced capital and (exogenous) technological 
change: 
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• Becker and Schultz developed the concept of human capital in the 1960s embodying 
investments in education and training; 
• Natural capital was included as result of economic research starting after the first «oil 
price shock» in the 1970s when economists started to ask whether growth processes 
could be sustained in the face of exhaustible resources, see Hartwick (1977); 
• And Romer (1990) introduced technological advances as an important endogenous 
driving force of development some twenty years ago. 
Since then reasearch has also been carried out regarding the importance of governance 
systems and the functioning of institutions for development, see e.g. Chapter 11 of Aghion 
and Howitt op.cit. Practical policy experiences indicate that this is an important factor for 
wether development can take off successfully or not. Below I call this institutional capital, IC. 
A synonym for this analytical or model based approach to understanding and explaining 
development is «the capital approach». This is simply a catchword for a model of develoment 
which in general and non-technical terms can be summed up: 
W = f(FC, RC, HC, NC, IC, TC), where: 
W = welfare, 
FC = financial capital, 
RC = real capital, 
HC = human capital, 
NC = natural capital, 
IC = institutional capital, 
TC = the stock of technolodgical knowledge. 
For Resource-Producing Countries, called RPCs in the rest of this paper, economic policies 
need to facilitate the transfers of exhaustible NC into other types of income generating capital 
or wealth like RC, HC and IC.  
Natural capital, NC, may be divided into a market based part, MNC, such as petroleum – a 
non-renewable natural resource - , fisheries etc, and a non-market part, NMNC, such as the 
functioning of ecosystems, biodiversity etc which may be quite important for e.g. agricultural 
developments in developing countries. 
We may now define Economic Wealth, EW, as FC + RC + HC +MNC. 
Non-Economic Wealth, NEW, can in turn be defined as NMNC + IC, and 
National Wealth, NW, as EW + NEW + TC. 
In  Annex 1 to this paper I will use this framework to show how comprehensive wealth 
accounting methods are used to measure the stocks of EW, and how this is used to assess 
whether development is sustainable in the longer term which boils down to judging whether 
real capital or wealth in real terms per capita is perserved for future generations. For 
developing countries simpler forms of wealth accounting or flow measures like Adjusted Net 
Savings (ANS) are proposed. See The World Bank: «The Changing Wealth of Nations. 
Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millennium» (2011) – containing updated 
ANS-measures for a large number of countries. Such indicators of sustainability should be 
used by Ministries of Planning- and Finance to assess economic performance in addition to 
traditional measures like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which by itself gives little indication 
of the longer term sustainability of development in RPCs. 
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3 The Resource Curse. 
To reiterate: Resource Producing Countries (RPCs) are defined as countries with relatively 
large stocks of non-renewable  natural resources like oil and gas etc. Income from extracting 
and selling such resources derive from depleting an exhaustible asset and can, in some 
occasions, be generated without the scrutiny of tax payers, donors, and lenders. Such resource 
revenues thus pose important intergenerational, political economy and governance challenges. 
Another challenge for RPCs, as already alluded to, is that – according to present national 
accounting conventions (SNA 93) – measured Gross Domestic Product (GDP) does not 
deduct the use of inputs of non-renewable resources. Thus rapid extraction of such resources 
would boost measured GDP and present economic well being. But if the non-renewable 
natural resource base is rapidly depleted and not transformed into other types of income 
generating wealth, growth in GDP will not be sustained, and such a country could be worse 
off when the temporary incomes peter out or is significantly reduced. 
According to Daban and Helis: «A Public Financial Management Framework for Resource-
Producing Countries», IMF Working Paper WP/10/72, RPCs are quite diverse: 
• A first group comprises developed RPCs characterized by low resource dependence, 
high GDP per capita, and strong linkages between the resource sector and the rest of 
the economy; 
• Middle Eastern RPCs which are mostly specialized in oil production. Oil contributes 
about one-third of total GDP and three-fourths of annual government revenues; 
• A third group of countries comprises emerging RPCs from Latin-America, Asia and 
Eastern Europe. These countries are characterized by high resource dependence, 
unequal distribution of income, and elusive social cohesion; 
• The fourth group is Low Income Resource Producing Countries – The LIRPC group 
– including large and small African oil producers (like Sudan), and small oil 
producers from Asia (like East Timor). Prevailing conditions are a rural economy, 
sometimes in extreme poverty, high resource dependence, and an absence of both an 
efficient bureaucracy and basic infrastructure. 
For all of these four groups of RPCs the overarching challenge for policy is how to avoid the 
resource curse, a complex phenomenon in which, through several economic, institutional and 
political economy transmission mechanisms, abundance of non-renewable natural resources 
may translate into stagnation, waste, and conflict. 
One such transmission mechanism is the «Dutch disease» - coined after the policy failures in 
The Netherlands in the 1970s. That is, the set of negative macroeconomic effects caused by a 
large increase in resource-funded spending. If mainly allocated to domestically produced 
goods, a large increase in spending can push up domestic prices, the nominal exchange rate, 
and eventually appreciate the real exchange rate. The results are shifts of capital and labour 
into nontraded goods sectors and an erosion of the competitiveness of the nonresource 
economy. In the case of The Netherlands in the 1970s, large increases in social spending – 
e.g. on «non-working benefits» like disability- and sickness payments – also led to reduced 
incentives to work and thus the supply of labour and employment. 
According to Daban and Helis, more recent examples of policy failures leading to Dutch 
disease are Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria, op.cit., page 8. 
Other transmission mechanisms that may lead to policy failures and an ultimate resource 
curse are: 
• The extreme volatility of resource revenues; 
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• Depleting a non-renewable, non-financial asset means that resource revenues are 
exhaustible and temporary; 
• Excessive reliance of resource revenues could transform RPCs into rentier states.  
• These countries thus face two major challenges for economic management: 
• How to design and manage economic- and fiscal policies to sustain growth and 
development in the face of exhaustibility? 
• How should we measure economic performance? 
The first question is further discussed in sections 4, 5 and 6 below, and the second in Annex 
1. 
4 Sustainable Economic – and Fiscal Policies in Resource-
Producing Countries 
As already mentioned, in the 1970s the economic profession turned its attention to 
sustainability: if essential non-renewable or exhaustable resources are finite, can economic 
output be sustained indefinitely? Hartwick in his justly famous article:»Intergenerational 
Equity and the Investing of Rents from Exhaustible Resources» (1977) showed that a simple 
policy rule for sustainability is to invest the resource rents in developing other (income 
generating) assets. This so called «Hartwick Rule» accords with common sense: Keep your 
income generating capital stock intact. But for reasons elaborated on in section 3 above, this 
has been and remains a major policy challenge for RPCs. 
While maintaining real wealth at the economy-wide level is a key objective for general 
economic policies, the same principles can be applied to achieve fiscal sustainability which 
should, according to Hamilton and Ley, be defined to be the maintenance of real government 
wealth when part of the endowment consists of stocks of non-renewable resources owned by 
the public sector. See Hamilton and Ley. «Sustainable Fiscal Policy for Mineral-Based 
Economies», (2011). 
For governments to achieve and manage fiscal sustainability, a number of distinct elements of 
the fiscal system need to work efficiently and effectively, including: 
• Effective rent capture by governments; 
• Fiscal rules or guidelines to limit discretionary use of resource revenues; 
• A savings instrument regarding resource revenues, for example a Natural Resource 
Fund; 
• Effective public investment and financial management. 
Some present examples of Saving Rules or Fiscal Guidelines are: 
• Botswana`s Sustainable Budget Index (SBI). It is calculated as Recurrent Expenditure 
(RE) divided by resource revenue (RR), i.e. RE/RR. Recurrent expenditure excludes 
spending on health and education, since these are defined as development 
expenditures, while recurrent revenue excludes revenues from the mining sector. See 
Hamilton and Ley, op.cit., page 8; 
• Timor-Leste`s Estimated Sustainable Income for a Fiscal Year (ESI) which is the 
maximum amount that can be appropriated from the Petroleum Fund in that Fiscal 
Year and leave sufficient resources in the Petroleum Fund for an amount of the equal 
real value to be appropriated in all later Fiscal Years. See Timor-Leste Ministry of 
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Planning – and Finance: «Establishing a Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste». Public 
Discussion Paper, Schedule I, page 20, 2004.; 
• Norway: Use only the expected future rate of return of the accumulated financial 
wealth in The Norwegian Pension Fund – Global, presently estimated at 4 per cent, in 
each years Fiscal Budget to cover the non-petroleum deficit. 
There are now a large number of different types of Natural Resource Funds, see Hamilton and 
Ley pages 16 and 17. But whether or not RPCs, developed or low income, want to establish 
such saving instruments, certain basic Public Investment and Financial Management features 
should be established in all LIRPCs: 
• A transparent and comprehensive presentation of resource revenues in the budget – 
emphasizing the role of the non-resource deficit; 
• A set of sound long-term projections as part of a realistic medium-term fiscal 
framework – including a set of well-defined budget classification; 
• A system of flexible and transparent transfers from a separate Treasury Account – 
e.g. in the Central Bank – to finance the non-resource deficit; 
• Developing a unified budget process, avoiding earmarking mechanisms. 
And last but not least: In judging how much of the resource revenues to be used in each year’s 
Fiscal Budget in order to build the RPCs sustainably: 
• Spend on building up other types of income generating capital or wealth, real or 
human (including health); 
• But do not overestimate the domestic capacity to build up such other types of wealth 
so as to avoid Dutch disease, 
• Think through the intergenerational challenges of saving non-renewable wealth for 
future generations according to basic principles of making current growth and 
development sustainable over the medium – and longer term.  
5 Wealth and Economic - and Fiscal Policies in a Developed 
Resource-Producing Country: The Case of Norway 
Ever since the 1970s when petroleum wealth emerged as an important factor in the 
Norwegian economy and an important element in economic policy, restraining current use of 
rapidly increasing but ultimately exhaustible revenues from petroleum activities in Norway 
has been the key policy issue and a constant challenge for The Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance - in charge of both economic- and fiscal policies. 
The first task was to develop and establish a modern tax regime based on the notion of 
economic rent, and that this rent belonged to the Norwegian people – and not to foreign oil 
companies.  
The petroleum taxes (proper) consist of: 
• The corporate income tax (rate 28 per cent), and The special (petroleum) tax (rate 50 
per cent); 
• Both taxes are levied pursuant to The petroleum Tax Act of June 1975 (PTA), 
providing certain special rules deviating from The general Tax Act. Annual decisions 
by The Storting (Parliament) fix the tax rates. 
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In addition «Government take» may be seen to include the following policy instruments 
which are not petroleum taxes in a stricter sense. 
• The State Direct Financial Interest (direct state participation in licenses held and 
managed by Petoro, a limited company owned by the Norwegian state); 
• The CO2-tax aimed at reducing emissions of carbon dioxide on continental shelf 
installations, levied indirectly as a tax on natural gas and petroleum fuels emitted or 
burnt on the facilities (rate 0.47 NOK per scm/liter.) The tax is deductable cost in the 
base of the above mentioned corporate and special taxes; 
• The area fee, a fee payable in accordance with the Petroleum Act, serving as an 
instrument to enhance desired utilization of licensed acreage. 
From the outset, one was concerned with curbing the exploration rate (supply) of Norwegian 
petroleum and spending the revenues sustainably in a longer term perspective. 
In the 1970s one adopted targets or ceilings for extraction and production in order to limit 
supply. However, this did not work very well as these politically adopted supply ceilings 
proved very difficult to achieve in practice as the oil companies pushed hard to increase 
exploration and production. Thus the second line of defense became to limit government 
current spending of petroleum revenues, looking for mechanisms to invest these revenues 
from the drawing down of non-renewable natural capital into other forms of wealth or capital 
– thus saving as much as politically possible for future generations of Norwegians. 
Restraining expenditures and saving an appropriate part of our marketbased and non-
renewable natural capital for future generations has been a very large challenge for economic- 
and fiscal policies, and it continues to be so. In 1990, during our worst economic crisis since 
World War II, a Petroleum Fund was established into which all income – tax income and 
income from Norwegian stock owned petroleum companies – is chanelled. The first year of 
net income in the Fund was 1996. At the end of 2010 the financial capital stock of the Fund is 
estimated at some 500 billion USD, and according to The Revised National Budget 2010 the 
stock may increase to some 990 billion USD by 2020 – a Large Sovereign Wealth Fund for a 
small country of some 4.7 million people.  
The basic principles of this «Norwegian» model of saving resource revenues and sustainable 
fiscal policies are: 
• Integration with The Central Governments Fiscal Budget; 
• The petroleum rent accumulated as financial wealth is saved for use by future 
generations of Norwegians, cfr. The Hartwick Rule, and invested in financial- and 
real wealth abroad; 
• Transparency so that the governments key policy instrument – The Fiscal Budget – is 
not undermined, so that the risk of «Dutch disease» is reduced, and so that the 
strategy of managing the exhaustable natural wealth sustainably gets broad political 
and popular support. 
In 2001 the Norwegian government in White Paper no. 29 (2000-2001) proposed a Fiscal 
Guideline for the use of the permanent income which may be called a «bird in hand» 
guideline: Use only realized resource revenues rather than potential total revenues where also 
where also physical petroleum reserves in the ground are included. This guideline for fiscal 
policies, which a majority of the Parliament (all parties but one) adopted shortly afterward 
implies: 
• Income from petroleum activities is phased gradually into the domestic economy, 
approximately in step with the expected real rate of return of the present stock of 
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financial wealth of the Fund (The official name of the Fund since 2006 has been The 
Governments Pension Fund – Global); 
• One wants to smooth fluctuations in the economy in order to achieve high capacity 
utilization and high employment. 
This basic savings rule, the Fiscal Guideline, aims to achieve the following: 
• The yearly Government Fiscal Budgets are cushioned from fluctuations in petroleum 
prices. All revenues from petroleum activities are placed in its entirety in the Fund. 
The expected real rate of return – estimated at some four per cent per year of the 
capital base of the Fund at the start of the fiscal year – may be used domestically, i.e. 
in that years Central Government Fiscal Budget. Thus short term fluctuations in 
petroleum revenues have a limited impact on short-term fiscal policies, while at the 
same time most of the petroleum wealth will be preserved for future generations. I.e. 
saved and transformed into other types of income generating wealth - mostly 
financial capital abroad; 
• To achieve a stable and transparent phasing in of petroleum wealth over time; 
• The Fiscal Guideline does leave an opening for discretionary fiscal policies, e.g. as 
used during the 2008/2009 financial crisis. During the present economic upturn, the 
objective of sustainable fiscal policies is to use less than 4 per cent of the stock of the 
Norwegian SWF. 
The Fiscal Guideline will also contribute to stable, rulebased expectations about the use of 
future petroleum revenues and thus underpin monetary- and exchange rate policies. 
For more details see chapter 3 in The National Budget, Report no.1 to the Parliament (2009-
2010), especially box 3.1 page 53. 
While not explicitly acknowledged, the present Norwegian Fiscal Guideline is akin to The 
Hartwick Rule- petroleum is an exhaustible resource, and as already alluded to in section VI 
above, the bottom line of this rule is: 
• Use only the expected real rate of return on the realized, present financial capital 
stock today and save the rest; 
• The capital of the Fund, our main Savings Instrument, is preserved for future 
generations of Norwegians which will inherit large stocks of wealth in the form of 
financial capital abroad. 
Some  key features of the Norwegian National Resource Fund are: 
• It is wholly owned by the Central Government and is managed by The Ministry of 
Finance which establishes a fairly detailed investment strategy, a so called benchmark 
portfolio; 
• This investment strategy specifies investment instruments (60 per cent in foreign 
stocks, 35 per cent in bonds and 5 per cent in real estate), and a detailed geographical 
distribution of these financial investments; 
• The day to day management is carried out by The Central Bank separately from its 
monetary policy functions, 
• Detailed ethical guidelines are established for the Fund, and these are continuously 
monitored by an independent Ethical Council advising the Minister of Finance. 
Aside from the economic principles guiding the Fund based largely, I will argue, on sound 
and sustainable economic principles as discussed earlier in this paper, there are several 
interesting governance aspects: 
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• Norwegian politicians have accepted that all of the revenues go directly into the 
Fund, and only the expected real rate of return – a rule based criterium -decides 
largely what they can use in the yearly Fiscal Budgets; 
• Local governments receive none of the petroleum revenues directly. 
As underlined above, there are constant political economy pressures to use more than The 
Fiscal Guideline prescribes, and only in two of the years since 2002 has less than 4 per cent 
been used in the coming year. Recently experts in Statistics Norway argued that 4 per cent 
may lead to too much domestic spending from our rapidly growing SWF, and argued that a 
guideline of some 3 per cent should be considered – which still would amount to large 
amounts in a small, open economy with very low levels of unemployment. Arguments for 
using 3 per cent of expected, future real rate of return – rather than 4 per cent – are. 
• The expected future real rate of return may be less than 4 per cent; 
• The Norwegian economy may get a more balanced development path in the longer 
term if not all resource revenues are phased in less than 20 years after 2001 – given 
e.g. the expected ageing of the population.  
For more details, see Annex 2. 
6 Economic- and Fiscal Policies in a Low Income Resource-
Producing Country: The Case of East Timor 
Timor-Leste became a sovereign state in 2002 following a referendum on independence in 
1999. 
Some basic demographic- and economic data for Timor-Leste are: 
• 1.1 million inhabitants; 
• Life expectancy is 59 years; 
• 41 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line; 
• 47 per cent of the population can read and write; 
• 36 per cent has availability to electricity; 
• Gross national Income (BNI) per capita is some USD 2.458; 
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is USD 570. 
In 2002 the government asked The International Monetary Fund, IMF, to undertake a mission 
to evaluate how to avoid a resource curse in Timor-Leste as income from petroleum is the 
dominant source of income for the new state. Estimated petroleum wealth today is some USD 
24 billion, and existing production areas are expected to be empty by 2024-2028. 
The IMF mission recommended Timor-Leste to establish a Permanent Fund for East Timor, 
see Daniel, Krever, Ogata, Tablin and Webber: «Establishing the Permanent Fund for East 
Timor», IMF 2003. 
 
The Norwegian Petroleum Assistance Program (NPAP), presently involved in some 25 
countries, was asked by the government of East Timor to provide technical assistance in 
2003, and technical experts and consultants from IMF and The Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance assisted The Ministry of Planning and Finance in preparing a public discussion paper 
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in 2004: «Establishing a Petroleum Fund for Tmor-Leste», and the Fund was established in 
2005 – three years after independence. 
According to Daniel et. al., best practice Petroleum Fund principles are: 
• The fund should be coherently integrated into the budget process; 
• Fund assets should be prudently managed, coordinated with other government 
financing operations and invested offshore; 
• The rules and operations of the fund should be transparent with stringent mechanisms 
to ensure accountability and prevent misuse, op.cit., page 10. 
Several scenarios for a savings rule or a fiscal policy guideline for use of non-renewable 
revenues in Timor-Leste were considered: 
• Only the sustainable income from the government`s petroleum wealth should be used 
to finance the budget every year – estimated sustainable income (ESI). This is the 
maximum amount that should be appropriated from the Petroleum Fund in that Fiscal 
Year and leave sufficient revenues in the Fund for an amount of the equal real value 
to be appropriated in all future fiscal years. See Ministry of Planning – Finance of 
East Timor: Establishing a Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste, op.cit.; 
• A fixed share of petroleum revenue is saved in the Permanent Fund for East Timor, 
PFET, every year. 
The first savings rule was chosen from the outset, and a conservative investment strategy was 
followed by the PFET. 90 per cent of the assests was invested in cash and high rated bonds, 
and 10 per cent in shares and other instruments. In 2009 the portfolio of PFET was diversified 
in line with increased capacity in the fund. 76 of the portfolio is the responsibility of the 
Central bank (BPA), 20 per cent The Bank of International settlements (BIS), and 4 per cent 
by a private fund management firm. 
In 2009 and 2010, however, the fiscal guideline has not been followed, and hopefully a 
balance will be found in coming years between using exhaustible revenues domestically and 
building Timor-Leste gradually and sustainably. 
All in all, PFET, a permanent sovereign wealth fund (SWF) has been established in a LIRPC 
with considerable technical assistance, and it has been operated successfully since 2005. 
7 Conclusions  
Wealth – natural, real, financial, human and institutional capital – together with the level of 
technological knowledge, are the forces that drive growth- and development processes. 
Resource-producing countries must transfer their large endowments of non-renewable natural 
capital into other types of income generating capital in order to achieve sustainable growth 
defined as development that lasts. 
These countries face two major challenges for economic management: 
• How to design and manage efficiently economic - and fiscal policies to sustain 
growth and development in the face of exhaustibility? 
• How should Ministries of Planning- and Finance measure economic performance? 
Sustainable fiscal policies should contain the following elements: 
• Effective rent capture by governments; 
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• Saving rules and fiscal guidelines to limit discretionary use of resource revenues 
domestically; 
• A savings instrument regarding resource revenues, preferably a Natural Resource 
Fund; 
• Effective public management. 
How two resource-producing countries – Norway and Timor-Leste – have applied these 
principles in actual and concrete policies was discussed at some length in sections 5 and 6 of 
this paper: 
• The savings rule or fiscal guideline in these countries is akin to the Hartwick Rule: 
Use only the expected rate of return on the stock of their Natural Resource Funds for 
domestic budget/consumption purposes and save the rest; 
• The Natural Funds are the political responsibility of The Ministries of Planning – and 
Finance which issue detailed guidelines to the operating managers which are Central 
Banks and some others. 
There are considerable governance and political economy challenges in following these 
policy principles and rules as LI RPCs naturally want to build their countries. A balance has 
therefore to be found between this political priority and the lack of domestic absorption and 
management capacities, so that longer term growth and development may last 
Developed resource-producing countries should as far as possible supplement traditional 
economic indicators like GDP with wealth accounting measures of their stocks of capital in 
order to judge whether national real wealth per capita is maintained or enhanced – a basic 
sustainability criterion. 
Developing resource-producing countries with less resources and incomplete statistical 
systems should supplement traditional economic indicators with Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) 
- a flow measure which equals Net National Income plus expenditures on education minus 
depletion of exhaustible resources and CO2-emissions – to assess economic performance and 
the prospects for sustaining development in the face of exhausting their stocks of non-
renewable natural wealth. 
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ANNEX1. Measuring Wealth and Sustainability. Assessing the 
Sustainability of Economic Performance in Resource-
Producing Countries. 
 
A main message and recommendation in The Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi Report: »Report by 
the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social progress» (2009) 
is: 
«The report distinguishes between an assessment of current well-being and an assessment of 
sustainability; whether this can last over time. Current well-being has to do with both 
economic resources, such as income, and with non-economic aspects of people’s life (what 
they do and what they can do, how they feel, and the natural environment they live in). 
Whether these levels of well-being can be sustained over time depends on whether stocks of 
capital that matter for our lives (natural, physical, human, social) are passed on to future 
generations», op.cit., page 11. 
The Stigliz Commission also recommends that: »A monetary index of sustainability has its 
place in a dashboard of sustainability indicators, but under the current state of the art, it 
should remain focused on economic aspects of sustainability». 
Economic Wealth (EW) as defined in section 2 above is regularly calculated in Norway in the 
following four steps: 
• Step 1: Calculate resource rents of renewable and non-renewable resources 
(petroleum, fisheries etc), what I above referred to as marked based natural capital 
(MNC); 
• Step 2: Decompose Net National Income; 
• Step 3: Convert future streams into present values or wealth estimates; 
• Step 4: Calculate the stock of human capital directly through the revenue generating 
or Jorgensen-Fraumeini method, see Greaker and Lui (2009) for details. 
Comparing stock estimates in monetary terms of real economic wealth per capita over time is, 
of course, similar to The World Banks definition of Adjusted Net savings –  ANS -, see The 
World Bank: The Changing Wealth of Nations. Measuring Sustainable Development in the 
New Millennium (2011). Norwegian estimates, which are more complete and based on a 
modern statistical system developed over many years by Statistics Norway, indicate positive 
ANS – a flow measure - in the sense that economic wealth in real terms per capita increase 
over time indicating – viewed in isolation – that Norway seems to be on a sustainable 
development path. 
But what about non-economic wealth (NEW) as defined in section 2 of this paper? Strong 
sustainable development as we define it requires also that important elements of NEW are not 
reduced below critical or irreversible levels. We do not know the answer to that question, and 
I will limit myself here to the following three observations relevant for assessing longer term 
sustainability in Norway. 
Our estimates of non-economic natural capital in the form of physical indicators are 
incomplete and do not tell us whether we are close to critical and irreversible levels of such 
types of capital as biodiversity, ecosystems etc – a necessary condition for strong 
sustainability. We do not know the elasticity of substitution between these types of capital and 
other types. 
The second one regards sustainable public finances which is an indicator in the Norwegian 
Sustainable Development Indicator (SDI) set. Using generational accounting methods, which 
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inter alia assume maintaining present rules and expenditure- and tax policies in the longer 
term or up to 2060, calculations from 2009 show a deficit in public finances of some 3 per 
cent of GDP of mainland Norway fifty years from now. Although uncertain, including the 
projection on future petroleum prices and revenues, this SDI indicates that public finances in 
Norway may not be on a sustainable path despite large but declining petroleum revenues. 
High future petroleum prices may change this outlook. 
The third observation concerns the number of Norwegians in working ages that now are on 
non-working benefits (disability and sickness benefits) and thus not in the labour force. This 
SDI is now one in five going up, and one may ask if this is sustainable in the longer term both 
from an economic and social perspective. This phenomenon, together with expected ageing of 
the population, may be arguments for using less than 4 per cent of the financial stock of The 
Governments Pension Fund – Global. 
The World Bank computes wealth accounts with simpler methods, in which human – and 
institutional capita are measured as residuals, and ANS estimates for a large number of 
countries. These are recommended as useful indicators for whether countries, notably 
developed and developing RPCs are on sustainable growth paths for use of Ministries of 
Planning- and Finance. 
See The World Bank: «The Changing Wealth of Nations. Measuring Sustainable 
Development in the New Millennium». Washington D.C., 2011 for further details on these 
estimates and their use for economic- and fiscal policies. 
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ANNEX 2. What may Developing Countries Rich on Natural 
Resources learn from Norwegians Experiences?  
Managing the non-renewable natural capital in Norway, a developed country with a fairly 
robust Public Financial Management System by 1970,  over the last forty years or so may be 
characterized by a process of learning by doing. Some important lessons are: 
• The decision at the outset to establish a state oil company (Statoil) participating 
actively in the exploration and production of petroleum, and not leaving most 
activities to foreign companies. However, firm government control has been 
exercised by establishing inter alia SDØE 30 years ago, and ten years ago minority 
private owners were let in so that the company is now listed on stock exchanges; 
• The struggle during the 1970s to establish a robust national tax regime, inter alia to 
extract the rent into state coffers for the benefit of future generations of Norwegians – 
and not to foreign petroleum companies; 
• The establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund – the main Savings Instrument - some 
twenty years ago; 
• Establishing ten years ago with a broad majority in the Parliament a Fiscal Guideline 
– the main Saving Rule - for the use of petroleum revenues as an integral part of 
overall economic policies. 
Now, Norway is a small and fairly homogeneous society with – all in all –  fairly well 
functioning institutions and a governance system based on a reasonable amount of political 
cooperation and consensus. How much can be adopted by other RPCs – notably LIRPCs - 
countries which are different in many aspects and with relatively weak PFM systems? 
Firstly, I will argue that Norway actually did suffer through a Norwegian version of the Dutch 
disease in the late 1970s and for most of the 1980s. Government expenditures were generally 
too high, structural economic reforms were put off, and there were few firm rules for the use 
of petroleum revenues.  A number of politicians and pressure groups constantly argued for 
more use of oil- and gas revenues domestically, and successive Norwegian governments were 
not able to fully stand up to these political economy challenges. Thus lack of clear rules and 
sustainable economic- and fiscal policies in a developed RPC contributed significantly to a 
severe economic crisis at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s which in turn triggered the 
adoption of a Petroleum Fund (1990), fundamental reforms of tax- and labour market policies 
(1991, 1992) and a modernization of monetary policies and a Savings Rule or fiscal guideline 
for domestic use of petroleum revenues (2001). Thus over the last 20 years, and after a 
number of policy mistakes and our most severe economic crisis after World War II, we were 
largely able to cure our disease and pursue sustainable economic- and fiscal policies. 
Volatility of petroleum revenues is now largely taken care of by The Fiscal Guideline. 
However, it took us some thirty years to adopt this rule based approach, and I think similar 
rules should be adopted in resource-producing developing countries as appropriate to 
counteract the «resource curse». To have no clear rules should not be a policy option. 
The depletion of nonrenewable resources is counteracted by building up other capital assets 
through our SWF. Because each year only limited amounts can be absorbed into the domestic 
economy where unemployment presently stands at some 3,5 per cent of the labour force, they 
are largely invested in financial assets abroad.  
Emerging RPCs and LIRPCs probably do not have twenty years of learning by doing. They 
should as far as possible in building their countries sustainably: 
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• Establish rules and instruments for saving revenues from non-renewable resources 
appropriate to the situation and the political economy challenges in that particular 
country. Having no such rules or instruments should - as already stressed -  not be a 
policy option; 
• Build up Public Financial Management capacity as fast as possible; 
• Be aware of the strong and constant pressures to spend such revenues domestically, 
and the tendencies for many RPCs – also developed ones – to greatly overestimate 
the ability to absorb such revenues domestically in a profitable and sustainable 
fashion. 
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